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Abstract:
This note outlines and discusses some of the strands in the post-Keynesian literature on
business cycles. Most post-Keynesians have focused on endogenously generated cycles,
but the mechanism varies: some focus on the goods market, others on financial markets,
the labor market, or political intervention. The merits of formal modeling of the cycles
have also come in for debate.
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A slightly version of this note will appear in the second edition of "The Elgar Companion to Post
Keynesian Economics" (edited by John King).
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The time-path of aggregate output and its main components exhibits significant
fluctuations around trend values, as do other important variables, including employment,
productivity, prices, wages, interest rates and stock prices. These fluctuations are
recurrent but not regular. The pattern of co-movements between the different variables,
the amplitudes of the fluctuations and the length of the cycle vary over time. In fact, the
delineation of cycle from trend raises many problems, and cycles of different length may
coexist in the data; short-run fluctuations may take place with reference to a long-run
cycle, rather than around a constant exponential trend. The term ‘business cycles’,
however, usually refers to relatively short cycles, and the main focus in this entry will be
on fluctuations in output and employment for a closed economy.

Endogenous versus exogenous cycles
Business cycle theories can be categorized in different ways. One common distinction
concerns the ‘exogeneity’ or ‘endogeneity’ of the cycles. In some theories the
fluctuations are caused by external shocks and the cycle, in this sense, is ‘exogenous’.
The shocks may be completely random and non-cyclical. They constitute the ‘impulse’,
and the cyclical pattern is produced by ‘propagation mechanisms’ that spread out the
effects of the impulse. A positive shock, for instance, may induce firms to increase their
investment and, by raising the capital stock, this decision will affect future conditions.

Michal Kalecki (along with Ragnar Frisch and Eugene Slutsky) was a pioneer of the
external-shock approach. Most post-Keynesians, however, have followed a different line.
According to this alternative approach, external shocks may indeed hit the economy and
affect movements in economic activity, but fluctuations would occur even in the absence
of shocks. The fluctuations in this sense are created endogenously.
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It is sometimes claimed that a reliance on external shocks leaves the cycle unexplained
and that endogenous theories are therefore intrinsically superior from a methodological
perspective. The claim is not convincing. Unforeseen shocks do hit the economy; some of
these shocks must be considered exogenous, and it is easy to set up plausible propagation
mechanisms that convert random shocks into irregular cyclical fluctuations.

It should be noted also that the distinction between exogenous and endogenous cycles
carries no implications for economic policy. Most neoclassical economists may take an
external-shock approach, but policy intervention is both feasible and desirable in some
models of exogenous cycles, including some mainstream specifications. External shocks
that require policy intervention, moreover, also appear in post-Keynesian analysis as in
the case of the desirability of compensating for autonomous shifts in ‘animal spirits’.
Conversely, endogenous cycles can be generated in models in which markets clear and
outcomes are Pareto optimal, as well as in post-Keynesian models characterized by
important market failures. Thus, the feasibility and desirability of policy intervention
depend on the precise structure of the theory and its cyclical mechanisms.

In general, post-Keynesian theories stress the instability of markets and the need for both
regulatory constraints and policy intervention. This emphasis on the inherent problems
and limitations of free markets, rather than the exogenous/endogenous distinction,
represents the substantive difference vis-à-vis most mainstream theories of the business
cycle.
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Mechanisms
Endogenous business cycles can be generated in many ways, and at least four distinct sets
of mechanisms have been used in the post-Keynesian literature. The mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive, and some contributions combine several mechanisms.

The determination of investment is central to theories that focus on the goods market. As
a main component of autonomous expenditure, high investment leads to high levels of
aggregate demand and output. A high level of output, in turn, will be reflected in high
rates of profitability and capital utilization, and this will tend to induce high levels of
investment and output in the next period. If investment decisions are relatively insensitive
to changes in utilization and profitability, the resulting time path for output will converge
to a long-run equilibrium. A high sensitivity, on the other hand, makes this long-run
equilibrium (locally asymptotically) unstable: following a slight displacement from the
equilibrium position, the economy does not return to the equilibrium but moves further
away.

Local instability of this kind can be turned into perpetual fluctuations, rather than
cumulative and unbounded divergence, if there are appropriate ‘non-linearities’ in the
investment function and/or in other equations of the model. The existence of ‘ceilings’
and ‘floors’ represents a simple example of such ‘non-linearities’ (gross investment
cannot be negative, for instance, and output cannot exceed a full employment ceiling) but
other, less crude non-linearities may also keep the movements bounded and convert local
instability into endogenous cyclical movements. Kaldor (1940) is a classic reference for
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non-linear models in this multiplier-accelerator tradition, but variations on this theme also
characterize early contributions by Roy Harrod, Michal Kalecki, Paul Samuelson, John
Hicks, Joan Robinson and Richard Goodwin.

Investment needs to be financed, and financial markets are given a critical role in some
aggregate-demand based theories of the business cycle. The ‘financial instability
hypothesis’ developed by Hyman Minsky represents a prominent example (e.g. Minsky
(1982)). Suppose that, having recovered from past turbulence, the economy now appears
to be approaching a smooth equilibrium path. Along this path expectations are largely
being met and, using Minsky’s terminology, there is ‘financial tranquility’: borrowers are
able to meet their financial commitments. This very state of tranquility will induce
changes in the risk assessments of both lenders and borrowers while, at the same time,
financial regulators and policy makers may loosen the regulatory standards. Risk
premiums fall; lenders start giving loans they would previously have rejected, and
borrowers increasingly finance their projects in speculative and risky ways. These
behavioral changes relax the financial constraints on the rate of investment and a boom
ensues. Gradually, the ‘fragility’ of the financial system increases until a financial crisis
causes a rapid rise in interest rates and a contraction of credit and investment. A return to
cautious financial practices now follows and the process repeats itself, although the
precise financial instruments and institutions may be new and different. Minsky’s
theories, not surprisingly, have received a lot of attention after the financial crisis of
2007, and a number of formalizations have been developed; a recent example is Ryoo
(2010) whose model produces short cycles around a Minskian long wave.
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The role of labor markets and income distribution has been emphasized by a Marxinspired literature, with Goodwin’s (1967) model of a growth cycle as the most
influential example. The model describes the dynamic interaction between the
distribution of income and the accumulation of capital. When there is low unemployment
– when the reserve army of labor is small, in Marx’s terminology – workers are in a
strong position and the real wage will be increasing. As real wages increase, however,
profit rates suffer and the rate of accumulation declines. With a constant capital-output
ratio, the growth rates of output and employment fall, too. Unemployment soon starts to
increase, the balance of power starts shifting against workers, and, when the balance has
shifted sufficiently, the share of wages stops increasing. Since the level of profitability is
low, the rate of accumulation will also be low and the rate of unemployment keeps rising
at this point. The capitalists now get the upper hand, the wage share starts falling, and
profitability and accumulation gradually increase. This increase in accumulation
gradually raises the rate of employment, workers once again gain wage increases, and the
cycle is complete.

This model formalizes Marx’s ‘general law of accumulation’ and, in Goodwin’s original
version, the model has no Keynesian features. It presumes that the capital stock is fully
utilized at all times; output is determined by the supply side without reference to
aggregate demand, and investment adjusts passively to the level of saving. Hybrid models
have tried to overcome this weakness by including both Keynesian and Marxian features
in the same model (e.g. Skott (1989)).
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Political intervention may itself be a source of fluctuations. This is a position stressed by
many free market advocates, but the post-Keynesian argument for a political business
cycle is different. The classic reference is a short paper by Kalecki (1943). In a technical
sense, Kalecki argued, governments may have the ability to control aggregate demand at
(near-) full employment, but the maintenance of full employment generates cumulative
changes in worker militancy. Increased militancy and inflationary pressures quickly bring
together a powerful block of business leaders and rentiers and (supported by economists
who “declare that the situation is manifestly unsound”) the government allows
unemployment to rise. The result, Kalecki argues, is a political business cycle. Although
applied by Kalecki to short cycles, the argument is arguably better suited to deal with
longer-term fluctuations, and it has been used by a number of writers in relation to the
rise in unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s.

Formal modeling
Mathematical models have played an important role in the analysis of business cycles in
both post-Keynesian and mainstream theory. Not all post-Keynesians are comfortable
with the use of these formal techniques. Business cycles, however, involve complex,
dynamic interactions and in a purely verbal analysis it is virtually impossible to keep
track of these interactions and their implications. Without formalization it may be
difficult to decide, for instance, whether a given argument implies that there will be
persistent fluctuations, explosive divergence or convergence to a smooth path.

8
Most formal models of endogenous fluctuations are deterministic. This might seem a
serious drawback. The empirical evidence shows irregular cycles and, from a theoretical
perspective, it should be easy for both private agents and policy makers to forecast (and
to take action to prevent) a cycle that was regular and deterministic.

This objection is not as powerful as it might seem. The endogenous view of cycles,
firstly, does not preclude external shocks, and the introduction of shocks (ranging from
natural disasters to policy shocks and changes in animal spirits) may remove the
regularity without affecting the underlying cyclical mechanism. Deterministic, non-linear
dynamic models, secondly, can produce ‘chaotic’ outcomes that are hard to distinguish
from those of a stochastic model. Prediction in these models is virtually impossible, since
even the smallest change in initial conditions has dramatic effects on the subsequent
movements (e.g. Day (1994)). The incentives, thirdly, for individuals to try to uncover
and take into account aggregate regularities may be small. Most decision makers face
specific problems and uncertainties whose effects on the outcome of their decisions
dominate the effects of movements in aggregate activity. With limited informational and
cognitive resources, these boundedly rational decision makers may choose to ignore the
possible influence of aggregate regularities altogether.

Post-Keynesians, finally, have always emphasized the historical contingency of economic
models. Structural and institutional changes, such as the rise in the size of the public
sector, the deregulation of the financial markets, or increased international trade and
capital mobility influence the path of the economy and may necessitate a re-specification
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of the models. The real-wage Phillips curve (a key element in the Goodwin model) may
shift, for instance, as a result of changes in labor market legislation, and the historical
contingency also lies behind the Minsky argument for financial instability. It was
changing institutional forms and new financial instruments that led most observers to
perceive “a far more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than the one
that existed just a quarter-century ago” (Greenspan 2005,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20051012/default.htm). More
generally, until the severe recession that followed the financial crisis in 2007, mainstream
macroeconomists talked of a ‘great moderation’. Fluctuations appeared to become milder,
and the mainstream explanation focused on changes in monetary policy, deregulation and
financial innovations.

Beliefs in the disappearance of business cycles may have been disproved by events since
2007, but the historical contingency and the complexity of business cycles have other
implications. Small models, like the ones described above, highlight particular
mechanisms. But no single mechanism and no single source of shocks fully explain the
diverse patterns of fluctuations that have been observed, and the relative importance of
the different mechanisms may vary across both time and place. Thus the different models
should be seen as useful tools rather than as complete explanations of the business cycle.
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